In NFIB, the Court adopted the first approach-what I will call the "particularist perspective."
That is, all Justices analyzed the constitutionality of the Medicaid expansion by reference to concepts, tests, and principles that, as far as the several opinions revealed, the authors thought particular to conditional funding grants offered from the federal government to the states. No Justices drew upon, or sought to further develop, principles or analytical frameworks that purported to be general in the sense of applying to other sorts of conditional offers of benefits-for example, conditional proposals made to individuals rather than to states, or made from state governments rather than from the national government, or made of an offer to provide some benefit other than cash or cash equivalent. The
Court's particularism was consistent with spending power precedents and with a dominant, though not universal, scholarly trend.
Perhaps, though, the Court's embrace of the particularist perspective was mistaken. In this essay, I explore the "generalist" alternative of analyzing the conditional spending problem as a subtype of the more general problem of "unconstitutional conditions," or what I prefer to call "the conditional offer problem" or "the conditional offer puzzle."
The conditional offer problem arises whenever government offers a benefit that it is not constitutionally obligated to provide on condition that the offeree waive some constitutional right or protection. This, of course, describes the ACA's Medicaid expansion: Congress offered states Medicaid funds earmarked for certain classes of beneficiaries-funds that are gratuities, constitutionally speaking-on condition that recipient states agree-as, constitutionally speaking, they need not-to partner with the federal government to provide medical insurance for other beneficiary classes. But the characterization is equally apt of countless other superficially dissimilar governmental offers. For example, government offers employment on condition that successful candidates agree not to exercise varied constitutional rights, including rights of expression; land use bodies offer zoning variances on condition that property owners relinquish particular property rights or grant easements that the state could not command (without paying just compensation); prosecutors offer reduced sentences or charges, on condition that defendants waive the rights to plead not guilty and to put the prosecution to its burden of proof.
The nearly ubiquitous tactic of conditioning benefits (defined as any sort of advantage that the governmental offeror is not constitutionally obligated to provide) on an offeree's waiver of constitutional protections is rendered a "problem" or "puzzle" by two facts. First, everybody agrees that the tactic is sometimes permissible and sometimes impermissible. Second, courts and commentators are far from converging on any sorting mechanism. Despite voluminous case law and the efforts of many leading constitutional theorists over many generations, 1 judges and scholars have not agreed on a test or framework for determining whether a given conditional offer passes constitutional muster.
Indeed, many scholarly defenders of conditional-offer particularism are moved precisely by the seeming failure of so many conditional-offer general solutions. "Coercion" is a protean term: it can mean many things. Importantly, the two opinions seemed to mean essentially the same thing by it. To a first approximation, the NFIB Court understood coercion as the exertion of so much pressure on another's choice set so that she could not realistically do otherwise than the offeror desires or demands. Because I will reserve the term "coercion" for a nearby but distinct idea, I will rename the principle that the joint opinion explicitly invoked the "anti-2 See, e.g., Sunstein (1990); Schauer (1995); Alexander (1995) . compulsion principle." The constitutional vice of the Medicaid expansion, on this view, is that it "compelled" the states to accept.
Let us assume arguendo that the Medicaid expansion did violate the majority's "anticompulsion" principle, i.e., that it compelled states to acquiesce, in the sense that they could not realistically or rationally decline. On that assumption, the critical question is legal not factual. It is whether the Court was correct that its anti-compulsion principle represents a true or correct principle of constitutional law.
To support its "anti-compulsion principle," the majority advanced three main arguments. First, it invoked Dole's suggestion that a conditional spending offer would exceed Congress's spending power if it were "so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.'" 3 Both the Chief
Justice and the joint opinion understood this language to signal that the relevant constitutional line turned on the magnitude of pressure exerted upon the state offeree to accept the federal proposal, and also understood the magnitude of pressure in terms of something like the rational acceptability, to the state offeree, of the alternatives. First, as far as the two approaches identified in Section 1 are concerned, all three reasons are particular, not general. This is plain with regard to the first and third reasons. Dole directly concerned the constitutionality of conditional spending grants from Congress to the states, and the decision did not purport either to draw from, or to contribute to, a trans-substantive analysis of conditional offers. And the "blurred accountability" principle is a normative political theory regarding federalism: it concerns the distribution of power among sovereigns with overlapping authority, and bears no implications for conditional offers extended directly to individuals. In modest contrast, the contract law analogy is potentially general enough to govern or inform analysis of all conditional offers of constitutionally gratuitous benefits. In practice, though, it appears almost exclusively in cases involving conditional grants of federal funds to states, disappearing when offerees are individuals or when the benefits offered are something other than money.
Second, all three arguments in support of the legal premise that the Constitution prohibits conditional federal spending offers that "compel" state acceptance are remarkably weak. 9 As the governing precedent, Dole might seem to provide strong support for an "anti-compulsion" principle.
But that appearance is misleading, largely because one can doubt whether this principle, described in either "anti-compulsion" or "anti-coercion" terms, truly formed part of Dole's holding. If Dole provides less than robust support for the "anti-compulsion principle," the majority's two other arguments are even lamer. The Court's use of the contract-law analogy falls little short of legal malpractice. While "coercion" does render a contract voidable, contract law's meaning of that term is much narrower than the NFIB majority's. As the Restatement of Contracts emphasizes, that one party had "no choice" but to accept a contract or a contractual condition is never sufficient to make the contract voidable. There must always be, in addition to the lack of "reasonable alternative [s] ," an 9 Given space constraints, the argumentation in support of these contentions is much abbreviated. For fuller development, see Berman (2013) could not function well if contracting parties could void their commitments just because they had no reasonable choice other than to enter into the agreement. Yet the requirement that the offeror's "threat" be "improper" is absent from the NFIB majority's deployment of the contract law analogy.
Finally, the "blurred accountability" argument draws a constitutional line in an implausible place because the anti-compulsion rule marks off for special, disfavored treatment the polar case while permitting adjacent cases on the relevant continuum. On the majority's approach, Congress is entitled to attach conditions to its spending programs that exert so much pressure on the states as to make it very hard for state officials to decline. But when the magnitude of pressure that a conditional offer exerts crosses the magical line that separates "real hard choice" from "no real choice," and thus "pressure" from "compulsion," the offer is invalid. Yet surely a federal offer that gives states "no choice" but to accept threatens accountability less than does an offer that puts substantial pressure on the states while leaving them some choice in the matter. In the former case, a modestly informed voter can discern that the policy she dislikes was forced upon the states and therefore is the responsibility of federal agents. In the latter, it will require vastly more sophistication for the voter to develop an informed view regarding whether the pressure was such that, all things considered, the state agents should or should not have acquiesced. Accordingly, a concern that lines of political accountability ought to remain crisp, even if of constitutional stature, cannot justify the rule the majority defends.
In sum: (1) the legal principle that grounded the majority's holding with respect to the Medicaid expansion maintains that Congress may not confront states with spending proposals that the states could not realistically reject; (2) as far as the Court's reasoning reveals, this "anti-compulsion principle"
is particular to the context of federal conditional spending proposals extended to the states and not part 12 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2-302 cmts. a-b.
of a more general framework for resolving conditional offer puzzles that arise elsewhere; and (3) the anti-compulsion principle is doubtful 13 and poorly defended.
A natural hypothesis is that the weakness of the NFIB Court's anti-compulsion principle derives from its particularism. That is, perhaps the Court advanced the wrong principle precisely because it viewed the problem from the wrong perspective. Perhaps it would have adopted a different and more credible constitutional rule had it gone the generalist route. That hypothesis animates the remainder of this essay.
OF COMPULSION AND COERCION
I agree that coercion constitutes the heart of a general solution to the conditional offer problem. 14 But what I mean by coercion is different from what was meant in NFIB. As I will use the term, coercion involves an attempt by an agent to induce a subject to do as the agent wishes by the particular means of exerting wrongful pressure on the subject's freedom to do otherwise. And the paradigmatic way of exerting wrongful pressure is by conditionally threatening to wrong the subject if she does not comply with the condition. I believe that this is a good stab at explicating the concept of coercion, but little is lost by treating it as a stipulated definition of the word.
Take a stock example: the gunman's conditional threat communicated via the demand "your money or your life." This threat constitutes both coercion and compulsion. It constitutes coercion because the act threatened-to kill the subject-is wrongful. It constitutes compulsion because that same act is so disagreeable to the subject as to make it true, in a normatively meaningful (but not literal) sense, that she has "no choice" but to accede. The gunman engages in both coercion and compulsion 13 For an extended defense of this particular proposition see Glenn Cohen's essay in this volume. 14 The heart, but not the entirety. A conditional offer that is not coercive might be unconstitutional in virtue of its purposes or effects. See Berman (2001) : 42-44. For our purposes, the non-coercion-based grounds of unconstitutionality may be safely put aside.
because the pressure exerted by the prospect of the act threatened is both wrongful in character and very great in magnitude.
Contrast the gunman case with a schoolyard example. John tells his friend Miles, in strict confidence, that he fancies Priscilla. Miles then threatens to blab to Priscilla unless given John's pocket watch. Miles has engaged in coercion, or has issued a coercive threat, just in virtue of the fact that the act he conditionally threatens-to reveal a confidence-would be wrongful. And coercion is always a pro tanto wrong. But, very plausibly, Miles has not engaged in compulsion and if John does accede to the demand or the condition he has not been compelled. That is because the prospect that John faces if he refuses is not so onerous as to make it the case that he had "no choice" in a normatively robust sense. Imagine that John does comply with Miles's demand and that, sometime later, John's father inquires about the watch, a family heirloom. John's protest that he was compelled to give it away or that he had "no choice" other than to give it to Miles might not persuade. Yet John's father would agree that Miles committed a wrong-namely, the wrong of coercion.
In short, we have on the table two distinct but kindred concepts, "compulsion" and "coercion."
Section 2 observed that, pursuing a particularist line, seven Justices in NFIB found the Medicaid expansion to violate an "anti-compulsion principle." Section 3 criticized the arguments they gave for this principle. I will further maintain both that the Constitution does embody an anti-coercion principle, and that this principle governs the constitutionality of conditional offers generally.
COERCIVE THREATS TO WITHHOLD BENEFITS
Immediately, though, we confront a worry. The conditional offer puzzle (or the "unconstitutional conditions problem") arises only when the act that the government threatens is to withhold a benefit to which the offeree is not constitutionally entitled. (Strictly speaking, every "conditional offer" is conjoined to a "conditional threat." So we can comfortably refer to the "threat" and the "act threatened" even with respect to proposals more naturally described, overall, as offers.
Thus, the merchant's "two-for-one" offer also includes the "threat" not to give two if the would-be consumer does not purchase one. Here, "threat" is an analytic concept, not a normative one.) 15 Therefore, many have contended, the acts that the conditional offers that interest us threaten can never be wrongful in a constitutional sense, in which case the conditional proposal can never amount to constitutionally cognizable coercion.
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This contention depends upon the assumption that if some boon is not a constitutional entitlement, hence amounts to a constitutional "benefit," then government may withhold it for any reason at all. That, in my view, is a mistake. Reasons matter. Though the state may not be obligated to provide some benefit (a sum of money, a zoning variance, a criminal sentence of X years rather than
X+n, or what-have-you), nonprovision of the benefit might nonetheless violate the Constitution if animated (or otherwise "infected") by the wrong reasons. (Caveat: Ultimately, of course, much more needs be said about the ontology and epistemology of reasons or purposes in this context. For this short essay, however, promissory notes must suffice. Readers who are very attuned to these issues will notice that the exposition that follows elides potentially important distinctions.)
Blackmail provides an analogy. If you know (counterfactually!) that I am having an affair, you may tell my wife. I am not (absent other facts) legally or morally entitled to your silence and you are not legally or morally obligated to keep mum. Yet if you offer me your silence on condition that I pay $10,000 you have engaged in a legal and moral wrong, the wrong denominated "blackmail." How this can be has perplexed criminal law scholars, moral philosophers, and economists for generations. 17 The solution to the puzzle, I submit, has two components. First, although you are not required to stay silent, you do wrong me if you disclose my infidelity with knowledge of the harm it would cause and do not in fact believe that the disclosure is morally warranted all things considered, or if you are not in fact motivated by the potentially justifying reasons. Second, the fact of your conditional offer of silence is evidence that supports a defeasible inference that you would lack the right beliefs or purposes were you to make the disclosure you threaten. Of course, this is the barest sketch of the answer. 18 The key point is that this account explains how blackmail can be legally and morally wrongful even though the offeree is not entitled to the "benefit" offered (i.e., silence). And it is an account that grounds the wrongfulness of blackmail in its coerciveness.
Return now to constitutional law. Suppose I am correct that it is wrongful, constitutionally speaking, for government to withhold a benefit that it is not constitutionally obligated to provide when it does so for the wrong reasons. What reasons are wrong?
Here's a proposal: government may not take the expected fact that a proposed action would make exercise of some constitutional right more costly, burdensome, or difficult as a reason to favor that action. Naturally, government conduct (acts and omissions alike) affects the exercise of rights in diverse ways. Raising (or not raising) postage rates affects the cost and incidence of exercising expressive rights. A regulation of some substance or activity could make it harder or easier for members of a religion to perform a prescribed religious ritual. The default rule is that government may act despite anticipating or foreseeing that it would make exercise of a right more costly or difficult. 19 In other words, that an action would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of constitutional rights is not a constitutionally decisive reason against the action. But that does not entail that the state may treat 18 I have defended it at length elsewhere. For my initial motive-centered account, see Berman (1998) ; for my revised belief-centered account, see Berman (2011) . Concededly, this is a proposal, not settled wisdom. But for some empirical evidence that my account accords best with lay intuitions, see Robinson, Cahill & Bartels (2010 Government is under some form of obligation to, let us say, respect constitutional rights. That government may not take the fact that an action would burden a right as a consideration favoring that action is one aspect of this constitutional obligation of respect. Thus, for example, although government may build a road despite the burdens the road would foreseeably impose on Native American religious practices, it may not build the same road because it would burden such practices. Likewise, although government may have countless legitimate reasons not to provide welfare assistance for the poor, that the payments it contemplates might (through causal chains the details of which need not concern us) make it easier or less costly for poor people to vote or to worship or to bear arms is not among them.
When applying this proposal to conditional benefit offers, it will be crucial to clearly distinguish two related actions that government actually or hypothetically performs: the action of issuing a given conditional proposal, and the action that the proposal threatens (in these cases, the action of not providing a benefit). At this stage of the analysis we are focused on the latter, not the former. Because not providing a benefit upon an offeree's refusal either to waive a right or to exercise it in a preferred way burdens that decision (relative to the alternative action of providing it), the hypothetical or conditional government action of not providing the offered benefit is unconstitutional if it would be done for the purpose of imposing that burden or cost, as when done for the further purpose of discouraging future noncompliance with the condition, by this offeree or similarly situated others.
To forestall a common misunderstanding: my position is not that government may never act for the purpose of inducing a rightholder to waive the protection of a constitutional right or to exercise her right in a manner that the government prefers. Often, though not invariably, government is constitutionally permitted to offer conditional benefits as an intended means to achieve precisely that.
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Conditional spending would always be fruitless otherwise. But recall the two acts I insisted upon distinguishing. That the issuing of a proposal is done for the reason of inducing the offeree to waive a constitutional protection does not entail that carrying out the act threatened must also be done for that reason. In many or most cases where the deployment of such conditional offers is permitted, government would lack affirmative reason to provide the offered benefit if the offeree refuses to abide by the stated condition, in which event government need not act, when subsequently not providing the offered benefit, for the purpose of inducing the offeree to waive a constitutional protection.
Prosaic offers not involving the government might make this point clearer: When I offer you $10 for the shirt off your back, the reason or purpose for my issuing the offer is to induce you not to exercise your right to keep your shirt. But if you decline, then what best explains my consequent failure to provide you with the benefit of $10 is simply that I lack affirmative reason to provide it and not that I have affirmative reason to provide it but allow that affirmative reason to be overridden by a purpose in making exercise of your right costly.
The argument of this section can be summarized as follows. First, it is a constitutional wrong for government to engage in coercion (here, contrasted with compulsion), as by conditionally threatening to violate a constitutional right. 21 Second, one way government violates a constitutional right is by treating a rightholder less well than it otherwise would because, and not merely despite, doing so would make exercise of that right more costly or burdensome. Because this latter claim applies to acts of commission and omission, government may not withhold a benefit that the balance of reasons would otherwise recommend just because nonprovision of the benefit would make exercise of a right 20 When this is, and is not, permissible must be determined by provision-or rights-specific analysis, and not by general or trans-substantive principles or tests. Recall my earlier observation (n.14) that coercion is only part of a complete analysis of conditional offers. 21 By "wrong" I will mean a pro tanto wrong, thus potentially justifiable all things considered. Similarly, read "unconstitutional" as "defeasibly unconstitutional." more costly. It follows that government engages in the constitutional wrong of coercion when it conditionally threatens to withhold a benefit under circumstances in which the rationale for the threatened withholding, were it to occur, would be to make exercise of the constitutional right costlier.
Call it a "penalty" when government chooses not to provide a benefit or subsidy for an action in order to make exercise of a right more costly. The one-sentence summary of this essay's core affirmative claim thus becomes: Government engages in unconstitutional coercion when it threatens to penalize the exercise of a right.
ILLUSTRATIONS OUTSIDE THE FEDERALISM ARENA
Given space constraints, the proposal just put forth cannot be rigorously defended (and, where necessary, qualified) here. (Recall the caveat I offered earlier about governmental reasons and purposes.) The present defense rests upon two prongs. First, I hope that readers will find the claim intuitively plausible enough to entertain it as a working hypothesis. Second, I now provide a few illustrations of its implications in an effort to modestly bolster the coherentist case. Because the case law is notoriously inconsistent, actual judicial decisions will not perfectly align with the analysis I offer.
Nonetheless, a few instructive cases might strengthen the two-part claim that coercion-withoutcompulsion is unconstitutional, and that compulsion-without-coercion is not.
The facts of Wyman v. James 22 exemplify the latter situation. A state AFDC program required beneficiaries to consent to home visits by caseworkers. James refused to allow the visit. One reason for unannounced visits is to ensure that the beneficiaries are in fact single-parent households, as the program requires. Therefore, government had genuine reasons, unrelated to an interest in making it costly for recipients to insist on their Fourth Amendment rights, to withhold the offered benefits on failure of condition: without the ability to undertake suspicionless visits, it might lack adequate assurance that the money was going to single-parent homes. On this assumption, the conditional proposal did not threaten a penalty and was not coercive. Yet it is plausible that James was sufficiently needy as to give her "no choice" but to accept the condition. In short, the proposal plausibly amounted to compulsion but not to coercion. On the general coercion-based account I am selling, it should have been upheld. And it was.
Conversely, consider this slight variation on the facts of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission. 23 A homeowner petitions the state zoning board for a variance from a building height restriction. The board offers the variance on condition that the homeowner cede to the public a lateral easement that it could not command without paying just compensation. Suppose (fill in the blanks as you wish) that we can be confident that the public interest does not justify the height restriction that is on the books and that the zoning board conditionally threatens to enforce. Rather, the height restriction has been set "too low" just to make possible proposals of this sort. If so, the board is threatening to penalize the homeowner for standing on her Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for a taking. The conditional proposal, therefore, is coercive. But very probably it did not compel acceptance: the homeowner could reasonably or rationally choose to lump it. This is coercion without compulsion. It should not be permitted. And it wasn't.
Finally, consider plea bargaining. Given a sufficiently large differential between the sentence that a defendant would face if convicted after trial and the sentence he is offered to plead guilty, along with a sufficiently high expected probability of conviction if he goes to trial, he could find it simply irrational to reject the deal. The reason why this conditional offer would be unconstitutional mirrors the argument against the Medicaid expansion just sketched: (1) the legitimate reasons for providing states with federal funds for children apply whether or not the state agrees to bar gay couples from adopting children. (2) Withholding the benefit, then, can only be understood or explained as a means to make more costly exercise of a state's right to allow gay couples to adopt, thus discouraging states from maintaining that policy in the face of Congress's divergent preference. The conditional threat thus violates the anticoercion principle. So too does the Medicaid expansion.
That, in any event, is the prima facie case for the states. There are many things to be said for the national government in its defense. 31 Unfortunately, they cannot be addressed in a short essay. My 29 For research that purportedly supports this conclusion see Regnerus (2012) . I am very far from endorsing that judgment. I use this hypothetical, however, to pump intuitions supportive of the possibility that conditional spending offers might be unconstitutional for threatening a penalty, on the part of readers with liberal or nationalist sympathies who likely favored Ginsburg's position in NFIB. 30 For discussion of the ease with which the germaneness requirement can be satisfied, see Baker & Berman (2003): 512-17 . See also Transcript of Oral Argument in Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., No. 12-10, April 22, 2013 ("The government provides lots of funding to universities . . . so anything that would be germane to the general purpose of higher education presumably could be attached as a condition to those funds.") (Alito, J.). 31 One thing that might possibly be said for the national government-namely, that my analysis is inconsistent with the central precedent in this area, Dole-does not move me. In fact, under my analysis, Dole was, very probably, wrongly decided. (For details, see Berman (2013) : 1329-33.) But I do not find that bullet too hard to bite.
